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This paper argues that the global economic recession provides an instructive point to reconsider recent
theorisations of post-politics for two reasons. First, theories of the post-political can help us to under-
stand the current neoliberal impasse, and second, current transformations provide us with an empirical
basis to test the limits of these explanatory frameworks. While the resurgence of neoliberal policies,
evidenced through the state-sponsored rescue of the financial sector and the introduction of harsh
austerity measures in many countries, appear to confirm post-politics, various protest movements have
testified to a concurrent re-politicisation of the economy. Furthermore, crises constitute periods of
disruption to the discursive and symbolic order, which open a space for hegemonic struggle, however
fleeting. We focus our analysis on Ireland's ‘ghost estates’ e residential developments left abandoned or
unfinished after the property crash e and their treatment within mainstream print media. We argue that
in the context of crash, the ‘ghost estate’ functioned as an ‘empty signifier’ through which hegemonic
struggles over how to narrate, and thus re-inscribe, the event of the crisis were staged. We explore the
double role played by ‘ghost estates’: firstly, as an opening for politics, and secondly, as a vehicle used to
discursively contain the crisis through a neoliberal narrative of ‘excess’. We argue that our analysis offers
an instructive example of how post-politicisation occurs as a process that is always contingent,
contextual, and partial, and reliant on the cooption and coproduction of existing cultural signifiers with
emergent narrations of crisis.
© 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.Introduction
Since, ‘society doesn't exist’, its ultimate unity can be symbol-
ised only in the guise of an empty signifier hegemonised by
some particular content e the struggle for this content is the
political struggle (Zizek, 1999, 207).
How do you know you are in a 'ghost estate'? Often, from the
outside, they look like any other new housing estate … But
nothing prepares you for seeing them up close, for the echo of
your footstep on the gravel, for the sight of a toilet abandoned in
a hall, or a wing-backed three-piece suite in a derelict sitting
room (Irish Independent, 2010b).
Although the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC) heralded a
“Berlin wall moment” for neoliberal capitalism (Peck, Theodore &
Brenner, 2010), the wellspring of evidence suggests this system
has emerged resurgent. Financial institutions were ‘bailed out’: þ353 1 708 3573.
laghan).while governments turned to harsh austerity measures in attempts
to cut public spending and restore national ‘competitiveness’.
Ireland offers a clear case in point. From 1993 to 2007 Ireland
experienced a period of unprecedented economic growth. Pre-
senting itself as a small open and liberalised economy with a low
corporate tax rate, the country became a leading destination for
footloose transnational capital. A period of export-led growth
during the 1990s was followed in the 2000s by growth largely
predicated on a debt-fuelled property bubble. From 2007 onwards,
as the global financial system collapsed, so too did Ireland's eco-
nomic miracle, leaving in its trail mass unemployment (peaking at
14.6%), large scale emigration (net emigration of over 122,000
since April 2009), a broken banking sector (the country's 6 prin-
cipal banking institutions were, at least partially, nationalised), an
indebted government (government debt standing at 117% of GDP)
and public (1 in 8 households with a mortgage in arrears of 90
days or more), and a wrecked housing market (prices having
dropped over 50% for houses and 60% for apartments) up to April
2013.
Despite such a negative transformation, Ireland adopted aus-
terity and embraced an EU-ECB-IMF-led structural adjustment
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retain its position as a destination for global capital. In so doing,
Ireland has become the poster child of recovery through austerity;
so much so that in October 2012 An Taoiseach Enda Kenny (the Irish
Prime Minister) found himself on the front cover of Time magazine
under the title ‘The Celtic comeback… what the rest of Europe can
learn from him’.
These developments would seem to confirm theories of post-
politics, post-democracy, and de-politicisation, which have gained
cache and critique in recent years (Allmendinger & Haughton,
2012; Barnett, 2012; Crouch, 2004; Dikeç, 2005; Haughton,
Allmendinger, & Oosterlynck, 2013; Oosterlynck & Swyngedouw,
2010; Ruez, 2013; Swyngedouw, 2009; 2011). While these con-
cepts have been heterogeneously deployed, key theorists e
including Jacques Ranciere, Chantal Mouffe, Slavoj Zizek and Alain
Badiou e share a concern with identifying and designating what
they see as the current political impasse. This they attribute to the
combination of the consensus around liberal democracy (in
particular the Habermasian version of deliberative democracy), the
rise of neoliberal globalisation, and the fragmentation of traditional
political divisions through post-modern identity politics (see Dean,
2009, 10e18).
“Recent events however, demonstrate that post-politics is far
from complete” (Gill, Johnstone, & Williams, 2012, 508). Despite
the state-sponsored rescue of the financial sector and the overall
resilience of neoliberal capitalism in the face of overwhelming
failure, various protest movements have testified to a concurrent
re-politicisation of the economy. Moreover, crises also constitute
periods of social and symbolic disruption. Walter Benjamin (1999)
has shown how capitalist modernity is predicated on a linear, his-
toricist, vision that needs to repress the material evidence of its
failure to achieve uninterrupted progress, along with the failed
revolutions that might have pointed towards alternative trajec-
tories (see also Edensor, 2005; Lloyd, 2008). During periods of crisis
it is precisely these symbolic fictions of linear progress that areFig. 1. Examples of ‘ghost estates’.
Source authors' photos.disrupted. Zizek (1999, 2008) shows how events that disrupt the
symbolic order need to be re-inscribed in newways, while Ranciere
(2004, 2009) in his work on the politics of aesthetics makes the
point that art can intervene politically to disrupt the ‘distribution of
the sensible’. These theories share a concern for the underlying
importance of discourses and symbolic fictions to the staging of
society, a point that we also seek to elucidate here.
We focus our analysis on Ireland's ‘ghost estates’ e residential
developments left abandoned or unfinished in the wake of the
Ireland's property crash e and their treatment within mainstream
print media discourse. Ireland's property crash left vast tracks of
vacant and derelict property scattered across the landscape. While
these came in many forms, ranging from largely vacant shopping
centres situated incongruously in rural towns to the iconic skele-
tons of would-be ‘landmark’ buildings in Dublin's city centre, it was
the images and stories of ‘ghost estates’ that became the material
and symbolic apotheosis of Ireland's economic crisis (Fig. 1).
The term ‘ghost estate’ was first used in 2006 by economist
David McWilliams to describe empty or unfinished housing de-
velopments in Ireland. He wrote:
All over Ireland, ‘ghost estates’ are enveloping many of our
towns. Driving back from the West, these spooky ghost estates
emerged out of the mist announcing places like Termonbarry,
Frenchpark and Edgeworthstown [towns in the midlands
Counties of Roscommon and Longford]… In the years ahead,
these ghost villages, like our famine villages, may stand testa-
ment to a great tragedy which, although predicted by concerned
observers, was never fully appreciated until the morning the
crops failed (McWilliams, 2006)
While the property market was still booming unfinished con-
struction sites were comprehensible within the dominant Celtic
Tiger narrative as developments that were yet to be completed and
occupied. For most people, they did not constitute aworrying sight,
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Tiger economic boom.
The juncture of the crisis changed this dramatically. With the
collapse of the property market, these empty housing estates e
which, in the intervening years, had grown in number (see Kitchin,
Gleeson, Keaveney, & O'Callaghan, 2010) e could no longer be
rationalised as ‘normal’ functional components of the landscape.
They returned as a problematic synecdoche whose increasingly
visible presence was simultaneously revealed by, and evidence of,
the crisis.
We argue that the ‘ghost estate’ constitutes a symptomal point
of Ireland's crisis, an empty signifier used to re-script the post-
Celtic Tiger era. We explore the double role played by ‘ghost es-
tates’: firstly, as an opening for politics, and secondly, as a vehicle
used to discursively contain the crisis through a neoliberal narrative
of ‘excess’. Our analysis of the ‘ghost estate’ suggests that the
discursive struggle to fix their meaning can be broadly understood
within the framework outlined by post-political theory. On the one
hand are attempts to raise the ‘ghost estate’ from a single issue to a
complaint signifying systemic problems, while on the other hand
there are attempts to disavow the political aspect of the ‘ghost
estate’. The latter, through the deployment of a series of techno-
cratic solutions, addresses the ‘ghost estate’ as a ‘particular’ rather
than ‘systemic’ problem.
To unpack how the ‘ghost estate’ is de-politicised offers an
instructive example of how post-politicisation occurs as a process
that is always contingent, contextual, and partial, and reliant on the
cooption and coproduction of existing cultural signifiers with
emergent narrations of the crisis.
Post-politics and crisis
Post-democracy and post-politics
With the intensification of neoliberal economic policies and a
broad acceptance of capitalism after the fall of state socialism,
Ranciere (1995, 1999) and others (Crouch, 2004) argue that society
has entered into ‘post-democracy’. “To the extent that state au-
thority is increasingly less able to constrain corporate power, pol-
itics matter less” (Dean, 2009, 11), while the consensus-based
approach of deliberative democracy and the celebration of the
individualised neoliberal subject have combined to diminish ‘the
political’.
For Ranciere ‘politics’ (sometimes referred to as the ‘police’) is
“the art of suppressing the political” (Ranciere, 1995, 11), while ‘the
political’ is an extremely determined activity antagonistic to
policing” (Ranciere, 1999, 29). The public sphere is “a sphere of
encounters and conflicts between the two opposed logics of police
and politics [and thus the] spontaneous practices of any govern-
ment tend to shrink this public sphere” by ‘disavowing’ the political
(Ranciere, 2006, 55). Government is oligarchic and politics only
occurs in fleeting moments of ‘disagreement’ (Ranciere, 1999), a
point of articulation outside the police order, but which aims at
transforming it.
Theorists of the post-political generally agree that the current
constellation more forcefully disavows the political in that “[p]
roper political questions always involve decisions that require
making a choice between conflicting alternatives” (Mouffe, 2013,
3). Under these conditions, “adversarial politics (of the left/right
variety or of radically divergent struggles over imagining and
naming different socio-environmental futures, for example) are
considered hopelessly out of date” and debate and disagreement
operate within “an overall model of elite consensus and agree-
ment” (Swyngedouw, 2009, 610). Mouffe (2000; 2005; 2013) sees a
way out of this impasse through a reformation of the institutions ofliberal democracy to better enable ‘agonistic’ politics of a pluralist
nature to flourish. Zizek's (1999, 236) concern, however, is that the
current formation of “post-modern post-politics… no longer merely
‘represses’ the political, trying to contain it and pacify the ‘returns
of the repressed’, but much more effectively ‘forecloses’ it”.
Zizek identifies two core components to this shift. First, drawing
on psychoanalytic theory he argues that the collapse of the stable
identity categories of modernity into the plural subject positions of
post-modernity has led to a decline of ‘symbolic efficiency’, which
diminishes the ability of groups to raise political demands to the
level of the universal. This “suffocating closure” leaves ‘irrational’
outbursts of violence as one of the only avenues through which the
political can return (Zizek, 1999, 203). Second and interrelated “is
thus the radical depoliticisation of the sphere of the economy”:
…theway the economy functions (the need to cut social welfare,
etc) is accepted as a simple insight into the objective state of
things… That is to say: if the problem with today's post-politics
(‘administration of social affairs’) is that it increasingly un-
dermines the possibility of the properly political act, this
undermining is directly due to the common acceptance of
Capital and market mechanisms as neutral tools/procedures to
be exploited (Zizek, 1999, 429e430).
Politics is, thus, foreclosed he argues because “a properly po-
litical act would necessarily entail the repoliticization of the
economy” (Zizek, 1999, 432).
The current post-politics, Zizek contends, prevents the “meta-
phoric universalisation of particular demands… [by mobilising] the
vast apparatus of experts, social workers, and so on, to reduce the
overall demand (complaint) of a particular group to just this de-
mand, with its particular content…” (Zizek, 1999, 203). With the
basic rules set in advance, technocratic management solutions will
always be put forward for the situation ‘as it stands’. This forecloses
the art of the impossible, which is the very ground for politics (Zizek,
1999, 237).
A key question we seek to investigate is to what extent these
parameters are challenged by the current crisis. To address this we
now turn our attention to the role of discursive and symbolic fic-
tions in sustaining our everyday reality.
Crisis, discourse, disruption
Zizek (1999, 64e66) argues that our reality is dependent on the
structuring role played by symbolic fictions that mediate the gap
between everyday reality and the Real (that which is outside lan-
guage and resists symbolisation absolutely). Our reality is mediated
by the symbolisation of the Real in ‘empty signifiers’ e a signifier
emptied of any one particular meaning and consequently open to
multiple, conflicting, interpretations e which cover over the fact
that reality is unspecified. However, in that there is no reality
outside of this ‘covering up’, the ‘covering up’ is our experience of
reality. As such, following Laclau, Zizek argues that “our social re-
ality is ‘symbolically constructed’ also in this radical sense”. There is
always a “minimal gap, the delay, which forever separates an event
‘in itself’ from its symbolic inscription/registration”. During periods
of crisis, this process is intensified, in part, because the discursive
and extra-discursive threads that structure reality become untied
and existing symbolic frameworks no longer reflect emergent so-
cial realities.
Drawing on Benjamin's theories on revolution as “as a repetition
that realises hidden possibility of the past”, Zizek argues that the
pivot between the potential for the political act to inaugurate a new
“positive order of being” and the tendency for it to be re-inscribed
back into the dominant order reside in the already present, but
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made ‘coherent’ by constructing new symbolic fictions through the
shards of the extant, but repressed, pasts.
Crises, therefore, are a combination of shifting political-
economic dynamics and their re-inscription in the discursive and
symbolic realm. Both of these components matter in terms of
producing the conditions for political alternatives to emerge.
However, theories of post-politics suggests that despite the po-
tentialities opened up by crisis for re-politicisation, the capacity of
groups to affect radical transformations has been severely curtailed.
Jodi Dean's (2009) work on ‘communicative capitalism’ is highly
instructive here. Taking a sympathetic but critical view of post-
politics, Dean argues that this literature can be useful in desig-
nating what is wrong in the current political impasse but that it
ignores, and thus fails to act on, the many sites of political struggle
that do exist on various levels. Dean (2009, 14e15) argues that
although “Zizek's position is weakest when he uses ‘post-political’
descriptively, his explanation is nonetheless insightful”. Her work
offers a critique of the Left's failure to challenge neoliberalisation,
but it is also concerned with unpacking what is specific about the
contemporary media, political, and cultural landscape that militate
against the universalisation of particular demands. She defines this
as ‘communicative capitalism’: “the materialisazation of ideals of
inclusion and participation in information, entertainment and
communication technologies in ways that capture resistance and
intensify global capitalism” (Dean, 2009, 2).
Dean's argument is that the contemporary media and commu-
nications environment (characterised in particular by the supposed
‘democratisation’ of new social media), while fetishising speech,
opinion and participation, ultimately provides a mechanism for the
capture of Left politics by neoliberal capitalism. She sees a funda-
mental disconnect between the intense multiplication and circu-
lation of political opinion and the increasingly narrow realm of
policy. While ideally, in line with Habermas's theories of commu-
nication, media debate should influence and shape policy, in large
part it does not. The “multiplication of resistances” that result from
the decline of symbolic efficiency “hinder the formation of strong
counter-hegemonies” in that “… the intense circulation of content
in communicative capitalism occludes the antagonism necessary
for politics, multiplying antagonisms into myriad minor issues and
events” (Dean, 2009, 21e24). Thus, the current media landscape
enables the disavowal of politics and reinforces the post-political
consensus of technocratic management.
The current crisis moment offers an instructive point to consider
theories of post-politics for two intertwined reasons: first, theories
of the post-political can help us to understand the current neolib-
eral impasse, and second, the transformations that are occurring
can provide us with an empirical basis to test their limits as an
explanatory framework. The core problematic that emerges, then,
is this: the diverse literature on post-politics outlines various rea-
sons for scepticism regarding the capacity of crises to engender
political actions that radically alter the path of neoliberal capital-
ism. Nevertheless, in this vacuum something does take place. The
smooth consensus is disrupted by material and discursive condi-
tions that challenge the coherence of the socio-political reality. This
opens a space of hegemonic struggle, however fleeting. Our aim
here is to analyse what happens in this fleeting space in the context
of Ireland post-Celtic Tiger.
Archive and methods
Our argument is based on a critical discourse analysis of uses of
the term ‘ghost estate’ in mainstream Irish print media in the
period 2007e2011. As our principal sources, we chose Ireland's
three major daily broadsheet newspapers, indicative of the coremainstream print media in daily circulation: the Irish Independent,
Irish Times, and Irish Examiner. Of these, the Irish Independent has
the largest daily sales (125,786), followed by the Irish Times
(92,565), and Irish Examiner (40,245) (Audit Bureau of Circulations,
2012), and all have established web presences and audiences.
All three publications occupy a politically centrist position, as
does the majority of Irish media more broadly. A range of factors
contribute to this conservative positioning, including a concentra-
tion of ownership into a handful of commercial media groups,
corporate and governance links between newspapers and the
wider (broadly neoliberal) apparatus of Ireland's political economy,
and the need for journalists to keep a small cadre of sources and
gatekeepers ‘on side’. Moreover, as newspapers became increas-
ingly reliant on advertising revenues accrued from evermore lavish
‘property supplements’, these proclivities (particularly in regard to
property development) were significantly amplified during the
boom (Mercille, 2014a). The Irish Times itself joined the property
sector through its acquisition of myhome.ie, a national property
sales/rental portal.
These factors have been further exacerbated by the crisis. During
the period 2007e2012 Irish newspapers' advertising revenue
decreased on aggregate fromV1082million toV334million, a drop
of 69%. Similarly, circulation of daily newspapers decreased from
608,493 to 499,072, a drop of 18%, in the period 2008e2012 (Flynn,
2013). This has led to a casualisation of journalism, a decrease in
full-time staff, increased demands for productivity, and a disin-
vestment in investigative journalism. One of the key outcomes is
that newspapers are now increasingly reliant on press releases for
their content, which are produced by vested interests in the private
sector and (particularly in Ireland) the Government (Flynn, 2013).
Previous research by Mercille (2014a, 2014b) has used a critical
political economic conceptualisation to demonstrate how the Irish
print media sustained the property bubble until its collapse and
worked to defend neoliberal policies during the crisis. Rather than
being ‘right-wing’, however, these publications are reflective of the
type of technocratic-managerial approach to governance described
in the literature on post-politics. In line with Dean's (2009)
description of communicative capitalism, these publications are
not devoid of left-leaning perspectives, although proportionally the
balance of content is in favour of a neoliberal consensus. In the
period following the crash, the mainstream print media was caught
between competing agendas. On the one hand was their broadly
neoliberal position within Ireland's political economy coupled with
their own vested interests in the property sector (Preston & Silke,
2012), while on the other was their need to commercially appeal
to a nebulous ‘middle class’ readership, many of whom had been
affected by the crisis. Their content, thus, needed to straddle the
demands of reflecting emergent social realities while defending the
neoliberal consensus. We can, therefore, expect these publications
to reflect the emergence of new discursive hegemonies.
In focussing on mainstream print media, we do not overlook the
growing complexity of the media landscape. Indeed an argument
could be made that Ireland's crisis period has seen an increased
proliferation of political debate through new social media plat-
forms (Kitchin, Linehan, O'Callaghan, & Lawton, 2013, Titley, 2012).
Moreover, the return of the political has taken many forms in post-
Celtic Tiger Ireland, ranging from the creation of new left parties,
the proliferation of an emergent ecology of anti-austerity protest
movements (Hearne, 2014), to the aforementioned explosion of
political blogs and other social media platforms. We are not,
therefore, claiming an over-arching position with regard to the de-
politicisation of Ireland's crisis. Nevertheless, print media remains
important to establishing new hegemonies in that its content is
frequently used as the basis for political debate and discussion in
other media, including television and radio, and its online formats
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Employing the Lexis Nexis search engine, we searched for arti-
cles in these three newspapers using the term ‘ghost estate’ in the
period 2007e2011. The search returned an archive totalling 462
articles. It shows a substantial increase in articles concerning ‘ghost
estates’ following the crash of the housing market, particularly in
the period 2010e2011 when the extent of the housing crisis
became apparent (Fig. 2). We conducted a discourse analysis using
Edward Said's ‘contrapuntal’ approach (Said, 1994). In Culture and
Imperialism Said uses this musical metaphor to conceptualise how
hegemonic voices and voices of resistance combine together to
cumulatively create overarching representations of reality that are
relational and in a constant state of becoming (see also O'Callaghan,
2012).
We used the archive to plot a thread through the overarching
media narrative about ‘ghost estates’. This narrative followed the
trajectory from the ‘discovery’ of ‘ghost estates’ to their ‘recapture’
in a new hegemonic developmental narrative. The articles were
coded using categories through which ‘ghost estates’ were dis-
cussed, and various modalities which they were used to construct.
This analysis was time sensitive, with consistent correlations made
between the evolution of the overarching narrative and the
deployment of differentmodalities. In our analysis we reflect on the
discursive struggle between attempts to raise the ‘ghost estate’ to
the level of a universal complaint indicating systemic problems and
the counter-position that seeks to reduce it to a particular issue.
‘Ghost estates’ in the Irish print media
Prelude: a soft landing
In order to frame the analysis of Ireland's post-crash media
landscape, it is first necessary to briefly set out the trajectory of the
boom, especially with respect to property, and the initial attempts
to script the unwinding of the economy as a ‘soft landing’.
After the turbulent years of the 1980s inwhich Ireland suffered a
series of economic and political crises, a new economic model was
adopted based on a combination of social partnership and neolib-
eral economic policies designed to attract foreign direct investment
(including low corporate tax, financial deregulation, tax-incentive
schemes, and an entrepreneurial and laissez faire planning sys-
tem) (Kitchin& Bartley, 2007). This model proved to be remarkably
successful in enticing FDI into Ireland and stimulating sustained
economic growth, with a marked increase in GDP per annum, a
rapid rise in total workforce (doubling in fifteen years), and a fall in
unemployment. Ireland was transformed from the second poorest
country inWestern Europe in 1987 (Breathnach, 1998) to one of the
richest in the world in terms of GDP per head of population by the
end of the 1990s. The population also increased from 3.5 million in
1987 to 4.3 million in 2007 (CSO, 2013).Fig. 2. Number of articles featuring the term ‘ghost estate’ in Irish Times, Irish Inde-
pendent, Irish Examiner 2007e2012.This precipitated rapid urbanisation. Between 1991 and 2006,
762,541 housing units were built in Ireland, with the number of
households increasing in the same period by 444,634 (from
1.029 m to 1.473 m) (CSO, 1991, 2006; DoEHLG, 2009). This
geographically dispersed constructionwas partly driven by a series
of urban and rural tax incentive schemes to stimulate property
development, which ran from 1986 to 2008. Planning policy at all
scales in Ireland is the preserve of the Department of Environment,
Heritage and Local Government (DoEHLG). Planning functions,
including the drawing up of county and local development plans,
planning permissions, and enforcement, is principally discharged
by local authorities, though the DoEHLG Minister retains supervi-
sory jurisdiction. Regional Authorities, eight of which were estab-
lished in 1994, have a remit to develop strategic spatial planning at
the regional level and to coordinate local planning within a region
through regional planning guidelines. Published in 2002, the Na-
tional Spatial Strategy (NSS) (DoEHLG, 2002) was expected to plan
for and guide “balanced regional development” during the boom. In
theory, a national spatial strategy devised by the DoEHLG guides
regional plans devised by Regional Authorities, that guides county
and local development plans (Grist, 2012). The NSS was not dove-
tailed with capital expenditure in the National Development Plan,
however, and there was a lack of joined-up planning between local,
regional, and national strategies.
Property development became a dominant driver of economic
growth in the years 2000e2007 and a highly significant source of
employment. People were encouraged to jump on the ‘property
ladder’ to avoid being ‘left behind’ and to borrow to invest in buy-to-
let investments, cheered on by a national media which confidently
predicted many more years of growth in Irish property prices.
Accompanying this was a rapid growth in property prices. The
average new house price rose fromV78,715 in Dublin, andV66,914
for the country as a whole in 1991, to V416,225 in Dublin (a 429%
increase) andV322,634 for the countryas awhole (382% increase) in
2007. Second-hand homes followed the same trend, costing on
averageV76,075 in Dublin in 1991, andV64,122 for the country as a
whole, rising to V495,576 in Dublin (551% increase) and V377,850
(489% increase) across the country in 2007 (Kitchin et al., 2010).
As the GFC started to unfold in 2006 and 2007, a new narrative
emerged within government, the Central Bank and financial circles
with respect to Irish property. This narrative asserted that Irish
banks were not exposed to the sub-prime loans that had contam-
inated other international banks and therefore any banking crash
should bypass Ireland, and that the Irish property market was
fundamentally sound and continued to present good investment
opportunities. It aggressively sought to nullify the voices of com-
mentators who suggested that a massive housing bubble had been
allowed to inflate andwas about to burst, taking the Irish banks, the
predominant source of investment and mortgage capital, with it.
The most famous example was An Taoiseach Bertie Aherne positing
that the naysayers who talk down the economy should commit
suicide if they had so little faith in the future.
The new mantra was that house prices might slow down, but
theywould level off and certainly not fall in valuee houses over the
medium term continued to be a sound investment and purchasers
should take advantage of the slow down to snap up property before
the market took off again. This narrative was widely repeated and
supported by the mainstream media, who largely silenced and
mocked cautionary commentators. This ‘soft landing’ narrative was
ruptured by the financial crash of 2008.
The crash (2008e2009)
On 29 September 2008, fourteen days after the collapse of
Lehmann Brothers in the US, Ireland's Finance Minister Brian
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protect them from the enormous storm swirling around the global
financial system. The guarantee included the five major banks
holding personal deposits, along with the commercial bank Anglo
Irish Bank (which alone has since cost the Irish taxpayer V34
billion, equivalent to one year's tax receipts, Carswell, 2011). This
decision was influenced by advice given to the Minister and An
Taoiseach on the night in question, much of it by advisors who had
vested interests in the banking sector, and the banks themselves,
who wilfully misrepresented their levels of debt. Writing two years
later, Vanity Fair's Michael Lewis (2011, 114) suggests:
Lenihan faced a choice: Should he believe the people immedi-
ately around him or the financial markets? Should he trust the
family or the experts? He stuck with the family. Ireland gave its
promise. And the promise sank Ireland.
Despite the stark ‘before and after’ picture painted here, the
onset of Ireland's crisis was slow to announce itself. Some of this
was dissimulation on the part of the Government, who, despite
mounting evidence to the contrary, tried to present the image of a
strong and stable Irish economy to the world. Even after Lenihan's
bank bailout, for instance, then Taoiseach Brian Cowen was
describing Irish banks as being “in a healthy state” (RTE, 2008). But
the complexity of the financial crisis also remained opaque to the
general public (and perhaps the Government), who were left to
anxiously await its unfolding impacts.
Internationally, the Left have used the GFC as the Marxian
symptomal point by which to uncover the true workings of the
system and present a counter-narrative to neoliberal globalisation
(Harvey, 2010). Such struggles over ideology, however, need to be
tied to some particular content in order to function as something
that “relates and applies to our ‘actual experience’”. Advancing
theories by Laclau and Mouffe, Zizek (1999, 205e210) outlines how
‘single issues’ will function as symptomal or nodal points in heg-
emonic struggles. For instance, in the context of legitimating
neoliberal cuts to social welfare during John Major's Conservative
Government in the UK, the ‘single unemployedmother’ became the
particular content “at which all the lines of the predominant
ideological argumentation” met.
In the context of Ireland's crisis, the ‘ghost estate’ emerged as
such a ‘single issue’ or ‘empty signifier’ in attempts to narrate the
crisis. The struggle to fill the ‘ghost estate’ with content constituted
a hegemonic struggle to discursively narrate the crisis and, thus, to
re-inscribe that event back into the symbolic order.
While radical anti-capitalist perspectives on Ireland's crisis have
been outlined in various contexts, they were generally absent from
mainstream media discourse. Indeed, only two articles in our
archive pursue the argument that Ireland's crisis was a conse-
quence of internal contradictions in the global capitalist system.
Furthermore, even when comparisons were made to other housing
bubbles in the US (McEnroe, 2010), China (Coonan, 2011), and
Latvia (Smyth, 2010), the common component emphasised was
human greed. However, as important symbolic sites in the crisis
narrative, media discussion needed to discursively deal with ‘ghost
estates’. Accordingly, some version of the debate casting the ‘ghost
estate’ as either a ‘systemic’ or ‘particular’ issue was also evident.
An early example by David McWilliams appeared in the Irish
Times in October 2008, which used the motif of the ‘ghost estate’ as
a way to animate the social and spatial affects of the bank bailout.
Essentially a short story, the piece concerns ‘Breakfast Roll Man’, a
small-scale property developer who has fallen on hard times. He
owes money on a loan to finance a housing development that is
now a “ghost estate” e “not one sold” e and with the banks pulling
his finance he feels he has been left to take the fall. “Worse still, thepersonal guarantees… mean that everything he worked for since
2000 is tied to this field on the N3 [a National Primary Road running
between Dublin and Cavan]. His whole world is cross-collateral-
ised” (McWilliams, 2008). McWilliams' article tries to grapple with
the question of how, in the context of the crash, the Irish public
were now to understand the Celtic Tiger era. In this, the ‘ghost
estate’ played a central role in signifying systemic problems with
the development model.
Similarly, economist Morgan Kelly presented a clear-cut division
between the economic boom and property bubble.
For 20 years, the Irish economy experienced extraordinary
growth. Unfortunately, this growth came from two separate
booms that merged imperceptibly into each other. First we had
real growth in the 1990s, driven by rising competitiveness and
exports. However, after 2000 competitiveness collapsed, and
growth came to be driven by a lending bubble without equal in
the euro zone (M Kelly, 2009).
When Kelly had identified the structural problems with Ire-
land's property bubble in 2006 he was loudly vilified, and only
after many of his predictions came true were his opinions
actively elicited by the media. Kelly's discourse of two separate
booms offered an instructive lens through which the public
could grasp the immediate causes of the crash. As Harvey (2012)
agues, processes of urbanisation are closely linked to the ab-
sorption of overaccumulated capital and historical evidence
shows us that property bubbles frequently follow periods of
expansion in the ‘real’ economy. Thus, while the trajectory of the
Celtic Tiger is hardly surprising, the two separate booms
discourse pointed to systemic problems with the shift towards
property-led growth.
However, rather than universally acknowledge the structural
problems of the speculative growth model, there was a further
attempt to split the era of property-led growth into a necessary
‘boom’ and a destructive ‘bubble’. Property had become such an
essential component of the Irish economy that it was impossible to
extrapolate what it would have looked like in its absence. However,
hegemonic interests attempted to disavow the political critique of
speculative growth by concentrating on the identification of the
housing ‘bubble’ as the ‘excess’ of a housing ‘boom’, the point when
things went ‘too far’.
Jodi Dean (2009, 56) outlines the role that narratives of ‘excess’
play in sustaining the fantasy of ‘free trade’. Despite evidence of
persistent market failures and structural inequalities, the premise
that the “perfect market…will meet everyone's needs and desires”
is sustained at the level of fantasy, she argues, because individuals
cannot imagine the capitalist system as a whole. Rather they ima-
gine, small, individual exchanges, which stand in for global flows.
When these stand-ins fail to support the fantasy, or are suggestive
of its failure, there is an attempt to rationalise them as ‘exceptions’.
The principal narrative she identifies in this regard is that of
‘excess’; “The one who fails to enjoy [the market] fails because he
has overdone something”.
A company expanded too fast; it tried to do too much too
quickly. Perhaps it failed because it overpaid its workers, over-
produced, or over-diversified (and hence lost touch with the
fundamentals). Similarly, those who find their stock portfolios,
retirement accounts, and pension funds decimated by falling
markets are likewise alleged to have expended too much. They
were overconfident; they didn't play it safe enough, they had
too much faith in the market… Everybody knows that ordinary
people can become overexuberant and that this can lead to
speculative bubbles. The wise investor should believe in the
market, but not too much. In the terms of the fantasy of free
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they were even greedy. At the very least, they failed to achieve
the proper balance necessary for the promised, inevitable,
market success (Dean, 2009, 59).
There was an attempt to construct the ‘ghost estate’ similarly
within a narrative of ‘excess’. Thus, the initial response was to
manage the problem by re-appropriating the waste of the property
bubble for other useful purposes.
Within this narrative there were divergent agendas. For
instance, community and sectoral advocacy groups suggested
using ‘ghost estates’ for social housing or to accommodate
growing homeless populations. Underpinning these proposals
was a welfarist agenda to appropriate vacant properties away
from the (failed) market to achieve a social dividend. Meanwhile,
different groups put forward a series of ‘creative’ ‘alternative’
uses the estates might be put to, such as start-up or pop-up
space for new businesses, film sets, or test-labs for smart city
technologies (Tipton, 2009). Regardless of their ideological dif-
ferences, these set of responses were part of a narrative that saw
the crisis as something that could be (to varying degrees) ‘con-
tained’ through the amelioration of the boom's obsolete
remnants.
These efforts were abandoned when it became apparent how
much housing oversupply there was, how isolated many of these
estates were, and how much it would cost to repurpose the
buildings (Boland, 2010; Kitchin et al., 2010). Discourses concern-
ing re-use began to fade away long before the point at which this
was established, however. Initially then, there was a failure to
reduce the ‘ghost estate’ to a particular problem that could be
solved by a simple realignment of managerial priorities. The dis-
courses identifying ‘ghost estates’ with more systemic problems
won out. It is as this point that the re-inscription of the shock of the
crisis in the symbolic realm becomes evident in media discussion.
In discursive and symbolic terms, the ‘ghost estate’ begins to
function as a ruin.Fig. 3. A fresh view of life: Hoardings around unfinished developments, Sandyford, Dublin
Source Philip Lawton.Crisis and narrative rupture (2009e2011)
i. ‘Ghost estates’ as ruin
Edensor (2005, 165) argues that, “…as glaring signs of insta-
bility, ruins deride the pretensions of governments and local au-
thorities to maintain economic prosperity and hence social
sustainability, and give the lie to these myths of endless progress
which sustains the heightened form of neoliberal philosophy
through which a globalising capitalist modernity extends”. Ruins
have, Edensor argues, a ‘dis-ordering’ affect on time and space. For
Hell and Sch€onle (2010, 6) “a ruin is a ruin precisely because it
seems to have lost its function or meaning in the present” (see also
Palsson, 2012). ‘Ghost estates’ emerged as ‘ruins’ in the context of
the collapse of the symbolic edifice of the Celtic Tiger, ‘overflowing’
the narrative and ideological consistency of the dominant order.
They functioned both as the ruins of the speculative property
bubble and the material manifestation of the ‘ruined’ future
promised by the Celtic Tiger narrative (Kitchin, O'Callaghan, &
Gleeson, 2014).
This discourse began to emerge towards the end of 2009. Media
articles explicitly articulated the ruin aesthetic of ‘ghost estates’ to
express the disconnection between the original plans for the es-
tates and their current reality. Frequent recourse was made to the
visual tension created by the contrast of lush advertisements
adorning hoardings surrounding semi-derelict shells or abandoned
construction sites (Fig. 3).
‘A fresh view for a new way of life’… The jaunty advertising
slogan of this particular development company has an unin-
tentionally ironic tone: the fact is, for a considerable number of
people around the country, living alongside unfinished de-
velopments has indeed become a new way of life… One
completed apartment block overlooks the shell of another,
which has an immense trompe loeil-type piece of fabric
covering two sides of it, giving the illusion from a distance that
the place is populated with couples on balconies taking in the
view, or sitting outside for a bit of al fresco dining (Boland, 2009)2009.
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scriptions of the estates highlighted were mirrored in the lives of
the residents “stranded” on them (Fig. 4). The lives that they had
imagined were replaced by an existence of uncertainty in
“degraded environments” coupled with “thewoe of having tomake
unsustainable mortgage repayments for homes that have tumbled
in value” (Irish Times, 2010). ‘Ghost estates’ were contextualised as
ruined spaces, leaving journalists reaching for visceral and hyper-
bolic allusions to articulate the social and moral catastrophe of the
death of the Celtic Tiger dream.
It was like a scene from one of those Chernobyl documentaries.
Empty houses rotting away, broken pavements, no street light-
ing, rubble everywhere and pools of water that you just knew
stank to high heaven. Except there were some people living
there, young homeowners who were trapped paying premium
mortgages to live in an unfinished estate where sewage bubbled
up outside their door in houses they knew were worthless
because they were unsellable (Harrison, 2010).
The descriptions of the physical conditions of the estates were
coupled with reports of residents fears about the lack of security
and anti-social behaviour that living amidst vacant spaces was seen
to attract. That the grounds for such fears were perhaps exagger-
ated was beside the point. The ‘ghost estate’ fulfilled a symbolic
function that sated the Irish public's “need to be haunted” (Till,
2005, 13) by the crash.
The ruin aesthetic of ‘ghost estates’ functioned as a vehicle to
express the symbolic rupture of the crash and to begin to re-
inscribe this event back into the symbolic order. This opened a
crucial political space in the struggle over the ‘ghost estate’ as an
empty signifier. Ruins have been “unwitting or involuntary vessels
for a host of human remembering, dreaming, hoping and fearing”
(Pensky, 2011, 77) and “gesture towards the present and the future
as temporal frames which can be read as both dystopian andFig. 4. Stranded residents: Report on ‘ghostutopian” (Edensor, 2005, 15). Thus, ruins can offer a powerful
mechanism through which to challenge dominant hegemonies.
However, political potentialities of ruins lie in their radical open-
ness, and are largely foreclosed when their meaning is ‘fixed’. Thus,
the struggle over how the ‘ghost estate’ was narrated as a ruin was
crucial to how the Celtic Tiger era was historicised, a point we will
return to later.
ii. Quantifying the crisis by proxy though ‘ghost estates’
‘Ghost estates’ also factored in more ‘ordinary’ debates that
sought to account for the crisis. One of the ways in which the
economic uncertainty of the crisis was negotiated was through an
almost pathological drive towards quantifying housing vacancy and
‘ghost estates’. Broadly, this was constitutive of two conflicting
drives: the ‘political’ imperative to understand the extent and ge-
ography of ‘ghost estates’ in order to mobilise a political-economic
critique of Government policies, and the ‘police’ imperative to
determine the level of ‘excess’ housing in order to quarantine this
‘dysfunctional’ component and strengthen the system. At the same
time, interest groups such as the Construction Industry Federation
e a lobby group for the construction sector e went further by
continually refuting evidence of housing vacancy and oversupply,
and arguing that new construction was urgently needed.
On 28 October 2008, the Irish Independent made the first foray
into what would become a prolonged debate about levels of
housing vacancy by making the claim that “At least 50,000 newly-
built homes are lying empty in ‘ghost’ estates across the country
because of the economic downturn” (Melia, O'Farrell, & Cody,
2008). Although they gave no real sense of how they had arrived
at this figure, within two days it was being cited as fact in the Dail
(Parliament) and being used by the opposition to lambast the
Government. By January 2009 the figure that was being reported
had doubled (F Kelly, 2009).
This latent desire for more ‘scientific’ assessments was some-
what sated in January 2010 by a series of maps and an estimate ofestates’ in Sunday Times January 2010.
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National Institute for Regional and Spatial Analysis (NIRSA) in the
National University of Ireland Maynooth (see Kitchin et al., 2010;
Kitchin, Gleeson, & Dodge, 2013). The NIRSA estimate of vacancy
(302,625 units) was published shortly after figures, (produced by
DKM for the Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local
Government (DKM, 2009)) indicating levels of oversupply of be-
tween 122,029e147,032 units, were announced by the Minister for
Housing, Michael Finnernan. Although both estimates were broadly
in line once allowances weremade for differences between vacancy
and oversupply (see Kitchin et al., 2010, 18e19), the perception that
the NIRSA estimate was “up to three times the estimate from [the]
Housing Minister” (Hutton, 2010a) caused a media sensation that
pushed the issue of vacancy centre stage e “For the first time, a
comprehensive map charts the locations of the empty and aban-
doned developments that stand as haunting monuments to the
Celtic Tiger splurge” (Hutton, 2010b) e and allowed for a
geographical discussion to take place (Fig. 5).
While this resulted in certain counties, such as Leitrim, being
singled out and perhaps stigmatised (see Pope, 2010), correlations
could be made between the location and distribution of the estates
and Government spatial planning policy and housing policy. This
provided an empirical basis to demonstrate how such policy actions
as the Government's implementation of the Upper Shannon Rural
Renewal Tax Incentive Scheme, their successive withdrawal from
social housing provision (Norris & Fahy, 2011), and their failure to
implement theNational Spatial Strategy (DoEHLG, 2002) contributed
to the creation of ‘ghost estates’ (Kitchin,O'Callaghan, Boyle, Gleeson,
& Keaveney, 2012). This was followed over the coming months by
other studies that sought to quantify the levels of vacancy (Williams,
Hughes,& Redmond, 2010)e although the precise figures remained
opaque, and the issue remained an open discussion, at least until the
DoEHLG (2009) released the findings of their National Housing
Development survey in October 2010 (which revealed there were
2846 ‘unfinished estates’) and possibly until the release of the 2011
Census figures in March 2012 (which revealed that 289,451 units
were vacant, 59,395 of which were holiday homes).
By insisting upon and ‘fixing’ their geography, the ‘ghost estates’
map transformed their meaning into the articulation of a geograph-
ically uneven crisis. This helped to put the debates about ‘re-use’ on a
more sober footing; creative alternatives were generally abandoned
andadvocates for social usesapproached the issuewithmore caution.
Similarly, it pushed a discussion about the systemic failure of gover-
nance to regulate property development and finance.
However, the map was also co-opted as a mechanism to quar-
antine the crisis in these estates. It became a cartographic repre-
sentation of the crisis of overproduction, a means to actually
visualise the bubble. This was intended to place a quantitative
measurement on the estates, but also frame a discussion around the
uneven nature of Celtic Tiger development (Kitchin et al., 2010,
2012). In the mainstream media, however, ‘ghost estates’ often
merely became the de-facto signifier of the bubble. As the sites
most iconically associated with the bubble, ‘ghost estates’ also
became a vehicle to ‘contain’ it.
iii. An era of excess
There has been massive over-zoning [of land for development].
This is now clear. We need to learn the lesson of the ghost es-
tates which we now have as a result of us losing the run of
ourselves during the Celtic Tiger years (Minister of State Ciaran
Cuffe quoted in Irish Independent, 2010a).
…But let's be fair about it: we all partied (FinanceMinister, Brian
Lenihan, RTE, 2010).The ‘ghost estate’ became the particular issue that stood in for
the crisis narrative. This narrative of ‘excess’ was then used to
recapture and contain the symbolic disruption. The Celtic Tiger was
recast as an ‘era of excess’. The ‘excess’ discourse captured the
collective claims made through the symbolic space of the ‘ghost
estate’ and deployed them to construct a narrative about the re-
sponsibility of particular groups and individuals for the crisis. It
used “losses to reconfirm the necessity of strengthening the sys-
tem” and isolated particular groups “as warnings, exceptions,
contingencies” (Dean, 2009, 62).
In the first instance, the crash instigated a clear shift in how the
figureheads of the era were perceived. The property developers
who had previously been seen as astute ‘entrepreneurs’ were now
labelled ‘gamblers’, the individuals who had been running Ireland's
banks were recognised as having run them into the ground, and the
political leaders who had credited themselves as the architects of
the Celtic Tiger became the hapless avatars of dumb luck who had
let their ‘economic miracle’ slip through their fingers due to
incompetence (Slattery, 2010). Meanwhile, those who had pre-
dicted the property crash underwent a transfiguration from pariahs
into prophets (albeit in Morgan Kelly's case, a “prophet of doom”,
Holden, 2010). The tripartite of banks, property developers, and
politicians were identified as the parties most culpable for Ireland's
property bubble (Carswell, 2011; McDonanald and Sheridan, 2010;
O'Toole, 2009; Ross, 2009).
The dominance of the narrative focussing on the role of in-
dividuals and groups in the crash was partly enabled by the fact
that, in contrast to other countries, Ireland's banking crisis was
almost entirely the result of a ‘home grown’ property bubble rather
than being due to exposure to US subprime mortgages (Honohan,
2010). National deregulations in banking and planning, along
with clientalist and corrupt politics at the local level, then, were a
necessary part of this story.
However, therewere two further crucial factors to the success of
this version of the ‘excess’ narrative in the Irish context. The first
relates to how the ‘excess’ narrative was married to assumed pa-
thologies of the Irish, which had its roots in latent post-colonial
anxieties. The second relates to the nature of the ‘ghost estate’ as
an empty signifier.
Ireland's Celtic Tiger period was characterised by “a releasing
of older notions of exotic and quaint Irishness in favour of
‘business chic’ Ireland… a mobile, postmodern Irishness for the
new millennium… celebrated for its ability to behave like global
capital itself” (Negra, 2010, 836e838). In this eschewing of his-
torical notions of Irishness in favour of a trans-cultural cosmo-
politanism, people emerged from a sense of “public guilt at being
Irish” and into a feel-good wave and thus accepted the discourses
of the ‘economic miracle’ in a largely unproblematic manner
(O'Hearn, 1998, xi). Post-colonial anxieties, evident since inde-
pendence from the United Kingdom in 1922, were repressed by
the Celtic Tiger development narrative, but with the crash they
returned (Lloyd, 2008). Almost in an instant, Ireland lost its ‘core’
position within the European economy and returned to being a
peripheral nation that, with its high levels of sovereign debt, was
threatening to become ‘surplus’ to the requirements of capitalist
modernity.
At its core, the narrative of ‘excess’ is haunted by the perception
that the boom was always ‘too good to be true’, and that the crash
was inevitable because the Irish were unfit to manage their own
affairs independently. This was articulated through a curious
mixture of melancholia and stoicism. There is both a sense of shame
and frustration that Ireland failed to live up to the promise of its
political and economic freedom, which is given form through a
melancholic rumination of set of ideals that are seen to have been
abandoned during the Celtic Tiger era.
Fig. 5. ‘Ghost estates’ in Ireland: The Irish Independent's coverage of the NIRSA ‘ghost estate’ map.
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‘Lament for Thomas McDonagh’. He wrote of his Dark Cow,
Ireland, “lifting her horn in pleasant meads”. The pleasant
meads were a metaphor for an independent Ireland. A greater
poet, WB Yeats, coined the unforgettable phrase “a terrible
beauty” [in his poem ‘Easter 1916’]. A terrible beauty, indeed, in
the deaths of McDonagh and Ledwidge. And a sort of prophecy
in the ‘Lament’, for we did, for a time, create pleasant meads for
ourselves. At the same time, we swapped the Dark Cow for an
animal of a very different kind, the Tiger. Then we killed him.
Now, instead of pleasant meads we have ghost estates. Before
long, I expect, wewill see “greedyweeds” devouring them in the
literal sense… (Downey, 2010).
One of the ways in which this shame and frustration was dealt
with was by internalising the responsibility for the crisis. This po-
sition, somewhat ironically, offered a way to reconcile the nation's
post-colonial history in a post-Celtic Tiger context.
Irish people have instinctively turned to emigration in times of
economic hardship ever since the Great Famine [1841-45 in
which over 1 million died and 1 million emigrated]. We
conveniently blamed that on the British… What was subse-
quently called the Great Silence was probably a consequence of
people feeling guilty because they could have donemore to help
the starving and thus helped to avoid the ensuing epidemics
that killed so many. To err is human, and to blame it on someone
else is politics. So we blamed the whole thing on the British. We
can still learn from the mistakes of those days. (Dwyer, 2010).
This discourse implied that by stoically accepting responsibility
Ireland could demonstrate its ability to stand on its own feet and
avoid returning to a position of dependency. The supreme irony
here is that by accepting the responsibility to bail out the banks, the
Irish Government locked the Irish people into a structural adjust-
ment programme that institutionalised dependency.
Through the ‘era of excess’ discourse, austerity was constructed
as not only necessary for economic recovery, but also a national
penance. A dose of sobriety, stoicism, and temperance would
ensure that the nation might rediscover its ‘essential self’ and re-
establish its credibility with international investors. Indeed, at its
most reductive, the narrative of ‘excess’ explains Ireland's crisis
through the normative, and highly misleading, phrase “we all
partied”. This perspective cloaks the socially and spatially uneven
impacts of the period of economic growth and the crisis that fol-
lowed (Fraser, Murphy, & Kelly, 2013), and while we do not claim
that this depoliticised understanding of the crisis is an over-arching
position, some, albeit qualified, version has become the new heg-
emonic narrative. The way in which the Celtic Tiger era was his-
toricised in the ‘ghost estate’ was crucial to this process.
As an empty signifier, the ‘ghost estate’ provides a perfect
encapsulation of Zizek’s (1999, 330e331) conceptualisation of
Capital as the Real of modern societye “ ‘reality’ is the social reality
of actual people involved in the interaction and in the productive
process, while the Real is the inexorable ‘abstract’ spectral logic of
Capital which determines what goes on in social reality”. The ‘ghost
estate’ was a powerful political symbol because it linked the ab-
stract machinations of capital to the level of everyday reality. But
for these same reasons, the ‘ghost estate’ became a potent tool in
the service of neoliberal ideology, by linking the narrative of
‘excess’ to the individual ‘consumer’. Thus, individual home-
owners were encouraged to feel a sense of personal responsibility
for having bought into the property bubble, therefore contributing
to the crisis: “we” were all guilty of ‘enjoying the market toomuch’,“we all partied”. It was precisely because the crisis in Ireland was
bound up in a property bubble driven by personal indebtedness
(Murphy & Scott, 2013; Norris & Brooke, 2011), and because the
icon of the crash, the ‘ghost estate’, was a symbol of ordinary life,
that the narrative of excess was internalised rather than
collectivised.
…the half-built units standing there reproachfully, like a
reminder of our excess… There is now simply no market for
these big, square houses. That's another odd thing about these
estates: most of the houses are big, solid, detached homes. This
was not housing for the masses, but mini-mansions for the tiger
cubs (Irish Independent, 2010b)
Conclusion
The ‘ghost estate’ was central to the symbolic re-inscription of
the crisis in Ireland. Hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forces
sought to narrate it for different political ends. Emerging as a
discourse after the crash, ‘ghost estates’ overflowed the symbolic
edifice and rendered the Celtic Tiger narrative, as it was, incom-
mensurable. Their subsequent articulation as ruins saw them
function as an empty signifier through which opposing narrations
of the crisis struggled for hegemony. ‘Ghost estates’ then became a
proxy measure for the crisis itself, which ultimately offered a
vehicle to ‘contain’ it. It did so by identifying ‘ghost estates’ as the
portion of ‘excess’, the part of the free market model that ‘went too
far’, and thus to be used as a cautionary example. In so doing, the
‘ghost estate’ was reduced to a particular issue, which began to
stand in for the crisis itself, signifying the Celtic Tiger as an ‘era of
excess’.
The neoliberal narrative of ‘excess’, which ultimately captures
the political potentialities of the ‘ghost estate’, is comprised of
features that can be illuminated by post-political theory, while also
speaking back to this conceptual framework. Firstly, the ‘ghost es-
tate’ is largely politically neutralised by its reduction to a ‘particular’
issue. However, our analysis demonstrates that political readings of
the ‘ghost estate’ could not be automatically foreclosed. Rather, a
series of technocratic discourses were attempted that failed to fully
efface the political dimension, before the ‘ghost estate’ and the
crisis was re-inscribed in the ‘era of excess’ narrative. This accom-
modation between the symbolic rupture of the crisis and its re-
inscription in a way that was largely non-threatening to the
dominant order is suggestive of Ranciere's (1999; 2004) theories of
disruption.
In support of Dean's (2009) analysis of communicative capital-
ism, the ‘era of excess’ narrative captures discourses using ‘ghost
estates’ as a symptomal point and selectively redeploys their
components in the service of strengthening neoliberalism. Cri-
tiques of post-politics have argued that within the “restrictive
definition of ‘the political’” outlined by these frameworks various
political struggles are dismissed as insignificant (Barnett, 2012,
677e688). In this, we concur that while Zizek's arguments are
instructive for illuminating the mechanisms by which ‘ghost es-
tates’ are depoliticised, to reduce this process to foreclosure is to
ignore a site of politicisation. Furthermore, our analysis suggests
the importance of the cooption and redeployment of pre-existing,
sometimes deeply rooted or repressed, discourses of cultural
identity, and their synthesis with emergent narrations of crisis in
the process of re-inscription. We disagree with Zizek's (2008, 180)
reading of Benjamin's revolutionary history, which attempts to
move towards a conception of “the paradox of a contingent actual
emergency which retroactively creates its own possibility”, and
thus potentially transforms the symbolic field in its entirety. Rather
our analysis suggests the centrality of revised versions of
C. O'Callaghan et al. / Political Geography 42 (2014) 121e133132recognisable histories to the transition from one inscription of the
symbolic order to another.
In approaching the crisis period, we conclude that theories of
post-politics are instructive in designating the current neoliberal
impasse, but that less dualistic conceptualisations can be more
attuned to capturing the nuance of political struggles that occur in
this void. Ours has been a modest attempt to reclaim the ‘ghost
estate’ from the de-politicised ‘excess’ narrative, and by virtue of
illuminating the political struggles inherent in this process, to
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